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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of allocating an object between two players in an envi-
ronment with one sided asymmetric information when their outside options depend on each
other’s type, causing the outside option of the uninformed player to be unobservable to her.
Consequently efficient mechanisms under budget balance are not always available even when
there is no uncertainty about which of the two players values the object more. A simple
condition on the outside options turns out to be both necessary and sufficient to guarantee
the first best. I also characterise the second best allocation under some conditions and show
how it varies with changes in the outside options. I argue that the model applies to an en-
vironment where property rights over the object are not well defined and their enforcement
is subject to an inefficient default game such as a contest. In such cases type dependent
outside options arise naturally as the equilibrium payoffs from the default game. The model
can explain why the best ways of avoiding inefficient default games, such as arbitration as a
way of avoiding litigation, typically involve a degree of inefficiency.
1 Introduction
This paper considers the problem of efficiently allocating an object between two players in
an environment where it is clear which of the two values the object more. I present a model
where the valuation of one of the two players is observable and known to be higher than that
of the other. When the outside option of one of the two players is zero, as is the case in the
usual buyer-seller case, this problem is trivial as the object can be allocated to the player
with the higher valuation, in exchange for a transfer that satisfies the participation constraint
of the other player. I show that this first best solution is not always implementable under
budget balance when outside options of the two players depend on each other’s type, and the
type of one of the players is unobservable.
∗School of Economics, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, Singapore 178903. Email: mad-
havsa@smu.edu.sg I thank Shurojit Chatterji, Giovanni Ko, Hamid Sabourian, and the seminar participants at the
SOE Internal Workshop for their helpful suggestions.
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It is possible to cast the inefficiency result of this model in the Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) framework. First, I relax the assumption that informational asymmetry is two-sided.
Second, there is no uncertainty about which of the two players values the object more. Third,
the distribution of valuation of the player with private valuation is left unspecified and need
not be continuous. However the key difference here that allows the inefficiency result to arise
is the treatment of outside options. In the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) world since
property rights are well defined, the seller walks away with an undisputed ownership over the
object in case there is no trade. Consequently the outside option of the seller is simply her
valuation. On the other hand the outside option of the buyer is zero. Contrast this to a world
where property rights are fuzzy and both players have partial claims over the object that are
subject to enforcement through an inefficient default game such as a contest played out in a
court. In such a case the outside options defined by the equilibrium payoffs from the default
game depend on the action chosen by both players, which in turn is a function of their type.
A simple condition on these outside options guarantees that the first best is not attainable
under budget balance (Proposition 1).
This paper is related to the literature on the Coase conjecture where a seller with observ-
able costs attempts to sell a single object to a buyer with a valuation that is higher than
the cost but uobservable to the seller. The inefficiency in that setting arises when the seller
makes offers sequentially and the buyer’s discount factor is less than one.1 There are two
key differences; first the inefficiency here will arise even when we focus solely on efficient
mechanisms rather than profit maximisation, and second, the inefficiency here arises even in
the absence of any discounting.
This paper is related to the growing literature on mechanism design when the reservation
payoff of a player is type dependent. Jehiel et al. (1996) analyses the mechanism design
problem when the final payoffs of the players are not solely determined by whether or not
they are allocated the good. Figueroa and Skreta (2009) study this problem further in the
context of a revenue maximising auction. In such a setting the optimal mechanism must take
into account the externalities arising from any allocation. In contrast to these papers, in my
setting the type dependence of the outside options does not arise as a result of externalities of
the allocation and indeed there is common knowledge about what the first best is. I assume
that the valuation of the uninformed player is always higher than that of the informed player.
Consequently it is always optimal to allocate the object to the uninformed player regardless
of the type of the informed player. The inefficiency in this setting arises from the inability
of uninformed player to accurately know her own outside option due to the unobservability
of the informed player’s type. This makes it impossible to always allocate the object to
her while satisfying both the participation constraint and the incentive constraint for the
informed player for all types.
This is also related to Aney (2012) which shows the conditions under which the out-
side options are always strictly better than any allocation that can be implemented using a
1See chapter 10 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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mechanism. The key difference is that Aney (2012) assumes that parties cannot commit to
the mechanism and this implies that they must take into account how truth telling at the
mechanism stage affects their outside option. In contrast this paper shows that when parties
can commit to the outcome of the mechanism, although they can improve over their outside
options, they may not be able to attain the first best.
The next section presents the model and the main result. Section 2.3 characterise the
second best under the assumption that the outside options arise as equilibrium payoffs from
a Bayesian game where the players are not subsidised by a third party (Proposition 2). An
application of the results is discussed the results is discussed along with how the inefficiency of
the second best varies with the inefficiency of the outside option (Section 3). Finally section
4 concludes.
2 Model
There are two players with preferences that can be represented by the usual quasi linear
utility functions. The players wish to allocate an object (that may be divisible) between
themselves that is valued at θ1 by player 1. The valuation of player 2 is θ bounded in [θ, θ].
For now we can leave the distribution of θ unspecified. I assume that
θ1 > θ > θ ≥ 0 (1)
Hence if player 1 is allocated a share β1 of the object, and a transfer of t1 is made to her, her
payoff will be β1θ1 + t1. As the object could be indivisible, β1 can also be interpreted as the
probability with which the object is allocated to player 1.
Any allocation of the object and transfer must be weakly greater than a player’s outside
option to induce participation. Let the outside options be v1 for player 1 and v(θ) for a type
θ player 2 where
v1 = Eθ
(
v1(θ1, θ)
)
. (2)
Note that in this setup the type of a player affects not only her own outside option but also
that of the other player. Since the type of player 2 is unobservable, player 1’s outside option
is an expectation of v1(θ1, θ) over player 2’s type. These outside options differ from the case
where type of player 2 is known. Let the complete information outside options be defined as
vˆ1(θ1, θ) and vˆ(θ1, θ) for players 1 and 2.
Before going further it is important to restrict our attention to the case where these
outside options are inefficient. If on the other hand the payoffs guaranteed by the outside
options are large enough, the first best would involve the players simply accepting their
outside options rather than attempting to avoid them by agreeing to an allocation of the
object. The inefficiency of the outside options implies that when both players have the same
information about the type of player 2, the joint payoffs for the two players would always
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sum to less than or equal to θ1. With complete information this implies
∀θ vˆ1(θ1, θ) + vˆ(θ1, θ) ≤ θ1 (3)
with the inequality being strict for at least some θ. Furthermore, with incomplete information
this implies
v1 + Eθ
(
v(θ)
)
< θ1. (4)
However in the interim case when player 2 is privately informed of his type it is possible that
∃θ v1 + v(θ) > θ1. (5)
This is because the informational asymmetry constrains player 1’s expected payoff to be v1
without regard to the type of player 2. This will be the key to the inefficiency showcased in
this model. In following section I construct an example where type dependent outside options
arise as the equilibrium payoffs from a contest. Although a contest is clearly inefficient, the
equilibrium payoffs may still satisfy equation (5).
2.1 Example
In this section I construct an example where type dependent outside options arise as the
equilibrium payoffs from a default game that is clearly inefficient but still satisfies (5). This
clarifies the point that the outside options could arise from a class of inefficient games, that
players would prefer to avoid, that yield a payoff that satisfies equations (3) and (4) but at
the same time also satisfies equation (5). Following are the objective functions of player 1
and 2 in the default game:
θ1E
(
P(x1, x)
)
− x1 and θ(1− P(x1, x))− x
where
P(x1, x) =
αx1
λ
αx1λ + (1− α)xλ λ, α ∈ (0, 1). (6)
To simplify things let us assume that the distribution for θ is discrete. It takes value θ with
probability q and θ with probability 1 − q. It is possible to solve out for the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium effort levels x1(θ1) and x(θ). To simplify things further I will set θ = 0. This
implies that x(θ) = v(θ) = 0.2 Solving for x1(θ1) and x(θ) and plugging these back into the
2To avoid the issue of non existence of equilibrium in the limit when θ = 0, since this implies that the complete
information effort levels for player 1 and 2 when player 2 is a low type equal 0, I assume that in this case player
1 wins the contest with certainty. This assumption simplifies the analysis but is otherwise innocuous since it is
possible to show that that θ1 is the limit of vˆ1(θ1, θ) as θ → 0. The only way to ensure this is by setting the
probability of player 1 acquiring the surplus to 1 in this corner case.
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objective functions, the payoffs for the two players are
v1 = θ1q
α(qθ1)
λ
α(qθ1)λ + (1− α)θλ
(
1− λ (1− α)θ
λ
α(qθ1)λ + (1− α)θλ
)
+ θ1(1− q) (7)
and
v(θ) = θ
(1− α)θλ
α(qθ1)λ + (1− α)θλ
(
1− λ α(qθ1)
λ
α(qθ1)λ + (1− α)θλ
)
. (8)
Similarly we can work out the payoffs when the type of player 2 is observable. These are
vˆ1(θ1, θ) = θ1, vˆ(θ1, θ) = 0, (9)
vˆ1(θ1, θ) = θ1
(
αθλ1
αθλ1 + (1− α)θ
λ
− (θθ1)
λα(1− α)λ
(αθλ1 + (1− α)θ
λ
)2
)
, (10)
and
vˆ(θ1, θ) = θ
(
(1− α)θλ
α(θ1)λ + (1− α)θλ
− (θ1θ)
λα(1− α)λ
(αθλ1 + (1− α)θ
λ
)2
)
.
It is now possible to check that equations (3) and (4) are satisfied. This is because contests are
inherently inefficient. Nonetheless (5) still holds since it is possible to check that v1+v(θ) > θ1
if θ is large enough while being less than θ1, and q is small enough while being greater than
zero. Since equation (3) is satisfied, if the type of player 2 is observable, bargaining before the
contest would lead to full efficiency. The object would be allocated to player 1 for a transfer
to player 2 that satisfies his participation constraint. Although the actual amount transferred
to player 2 would depend on his bargaining power, this will not affect the efficiency of the
allocation. However the unobservability of player 2 type makes player 1’s outside option
unobservable to her. Consequently she is only armed with v1, the expectation of her outside
option. The next section will show that if this unobservability is severe enough to cause
equation (5) to hold, the first best will not be implementable under budget balance.
2.2 First Best
In this section characterise the first best and show that a simple condition on the outside
options turns out to be necessary and sufficient for the first best to be implementable under
budget balance.
Observation 1. The first best is attained only if the object is allocated to player 1.
Let the payoffs from the mechanism be µ1 and µ(θ) for players 1 and 2 where
µ1 = β1θ1 + t1 and µ(θ) = β(θ)θ + t(θ). (11)
β(θ) is the probability with which the object is allocated to player 2 and the corresponding
transfer t(θ). Since player 1’s valuation of the object is always greater than that of player 2,
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awarding the object to player 1 is efficient. Hence for full efficiency β(θ) = 0,∀θ or conversely
β1 = 1 is necessary.
3
Proposition 1. First best under budget balance is implementable if and only if v1 + v(θ) ≤
θ1, ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ].
Proof. To start with note that since β(θ) = 0 ∀θ in the first best, t(θ) must some constant
t to ensure incentive compatibility. If not, player 2 will make the declaration that yields the
highest transfer.
I will first prove sufficiency. Set t = max{v(θ)}. This satisfies individual rationality
constraint of player 2 for any type θ. Since v1 < θ1 − max{v(θ)} the individual rationality
constraint of player 1 is also satisfied. This guarantees the first best.
I will now prove necessity. Consider the case when there exists a θ such that v1+v(θ) > θ1.
To ensure the individual rationality constraint is satisfied for player 2 of any type we need
t ≥ max{v(θ)}. This however violates the individual rationality constraint for player 1 since
v1 > θ1 −max{v(θ)}. This implies that the first best is not feasible.
This proposition shows that if the overestimation of her outside option by player 1 is
large enough, it is impossible to allocate the object to her while satisfying the participation
constraint of player 2. It is worth noting that the condition under which the first best is
possible does not rely directly on the distribution of player 2’s type which could be discrete
or continuous.
To see the intuition for this result note that the object must always be allocated to player 1
in exchange for a transfer to player 2 to attain the first best. Consequently the only incentive
compatible transfer schedule is one that is flat in the declaration of player 2. However if
v(θ) is large enough for some θ it will not be possible to transfer enough to player 2 while
satisfying the participation constraint of player 1. As a consequence of this whenever there
exists a θ such that v1 + v(θ) > θ1 we will find that there exists some inefficiency as a result
of β(θ) > 0 for some θ.
Corollary 1. First best is implementable whenever budget balance is relaxed.
Proof. Since player 1 values the object more than player 2, allocating the object to player 1
along with a transfer to player to of t(θ) = max{v(θ)},∀θ will ensure the first best. These
transfers are feasible if budget balance is relaxed since the constraint t(θ) ≤ θ1− v1 no longer
applies.
This corollary follows from the results in Groves (1973), Arrow (1979) and d’Aspremont
and Gerard-Varet (1979) that prove the feasibility of the first best in this environment when-
ever budget balance is relaxed.
3The object being allocated to player 1 is necessary but not sufficient for full efficiency since part of the transfers
made by the players may be burnt.
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2.3 Second best
We have seen how the first best is not implementable under budget balance whenever there
exists a θ such that v(θ1)+v(θ) > θ1. In this section I characterise the second best allocation
that can be attained through negotiation. To proceed further it is necessary to specify the
distribution of θ. I assume that θ is drawn from a continuous distribution f(θ) on the interval
[θ, θ].4 The equilibrium outcome of negotiations can be captured through a mechanism design
approach. As a result of the revelation principle we can restrict our attention to a direct
mechanism where player 2 makes a declaration θ˜ and gets a payoff
µ(θ˜) = θβ(θ˜) + t(θ˜). (12)
Note that this payoff satisfies the single crossing property since
∂
∂θ
 ∂µ(θ)∂β
∂µ(θ)
∂t
 = 1. (13)
This implies that monotonicity and local incentive compatibility, that is β′(θ) ≥ 0 and θβ′(θ)+
t′(θ) = 0 for all θ, are necessary and sufficient to ensure global incentive compatibility.5 Using
the well known procedure first introduced in Mirrlees (1971) we know that
∂µ(θ)
∂θ
= β(θ) + θβ′(θ) + t′(θ) = β(θ) (14)
by the envelope theorem. Integrating both sides we have∫ θ
θ
∂µ(w)
∂w
dw = µ(θ)− µ(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
β(w)dw. (15)
This implies that under incentive compatibility the expected payoff from negotiations for
player 2 of type θ is
µ(θ) = µ(θ) +
∫ θ
θ
β(w)dw. (16)
In addition to incentive compatibility, the payoff must also satisfy the participation con-
straints. This implies that µ(θ) ≥ v(θ).
Proposition 2. When the outside options v1 and v(θ) arise as equilibrium payoffs from an
unsubsidised Bayesian game, the optimal β(θ) = v′(θ) for θ > θˆ and 0 otherwise where θˆ is
the highest value of θ that satisfies
v1 + v(θ)− θ1 =
∫ θ
θˆ
v′(θ)
(
F (θ)− (θ1 − θ)f(θ)
)
dθ (17)
4The case where the distribution of θ takes only two values has been worked out and is available on request.
5See chapter 2.3.3 in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
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Proof. The social planner’s optimisation problem is
min
β(θ)
∫ θ
θ
(θ1 − θ)β(θ)f(θ)dθ (18)
subject to
µ1 ≥ v1, µ(θ) ≥ v(θ), β′(θ) ≥ 0 and µ(θ) = µ(θ) +
∫ θ
θ
β(x)dx
To start with note that the IR constraint for player 1, µ1 ≥ v1 can be rewritten as
θ1 − θ1
∫ θ
θ
β(θ)f(θ)dθ −
∫ θ
θ
t(θ)f(θ)dθ ≥ v1 (19)
Equation (16) implies that
t(θ) = µ(θ)− θβ(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
β(x)dx+ µ(θ)− θβ(θ). (20)
Substituting for t(θ) back into equation (19) we have
θ1 − θ1
∫ θ
θ
β(θ)f(θ)dθ −
∫ θ
θ
(∫ θ
θ
β(x)dx+ µ(θ)− θβ(θ)
)
f(θ)dθ ≥ v1 (21)
Integrating by parts and rearranging we find that
θ1 − v1 − µ(θ) ≥
∫ θ
θ
(θ1 − θ)β(θ)f(θ)dθ +
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
β(x)dxf(θ)dθ. (22)
Integrating the last term by parts we have
θ1 − v1 ≥ µ(θ) +
∫ θ
θ
(θ1 − θ)β(θ)f(θ)dθ +
∫ θ
θ
β(θ)(1− F (θ))dθ. (23)
Using equation (14) we know that
µ(θ) = µ(θ) +
∫ θ
θ
β(θ)dθ. (24)
Substituting for µ(θ) back into equation (23) and rearranging we have
∫ θ
θ
β(θ)
(
F (θ)− (θ1 − θ)f(θ)
)
dθ ≥ v1 + µ(θ)− θ1 (25)
We can see from equation (18) that the optimal β(θ) would take the lowest possible value
for each θ subject to the constraints. Equation (24) along with the IR constraint for player
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2 implies
µ(θ) +
∫ θ
θ
β(x)dx ≥ v(θ) (26)
To minimize β(θ) we can see that µ(θ) must be set as high as possible. Let µ(θ) = v(θˆ). For
minimising β(θ) we hold equation (26) with equality and find that∫ θ
θˆ
β(x)dx = v(θ)− v(θˆ) for θ > θˆ (27)
This implies that β(θ) = 0 and µ(θ) = v(θˆ) for all θ ≤ θˆ. Note that equation (27) implies
that β(θ) = v′(θ) for θ > θˆ. Since
∫ θ
θˆ β(θ)dθ is decreasing in θˆ we can go back to equation
(25) to solve for the highest possible θˆ that satisfies equation (17).
We now need to check three things. First since β(θ) must be in the interval [0, 1]. Hence
we need to check whether 1 ≥ v′(θ) ≥ 0 always holds. Second we need to check that
β′(θ) = v′′(θ) ≥ 0 since this is needed for incentive compatibility. And third, we need to
check whether
v1 + v(θ)− θ1 ≥
∫ θ
θ
v′(θ)
(
F (θ)− (θ1 − θ)f(θ)
)
dθ (28)
since this will ensure the existence of θˆ ∈ [θ, θ].
The value function for a player can be decomposed into a transfer and a probability of
acquiring the object. In particular the outside options of players 1 and 2 can be written as
v1 = Eθ
(
θ1α1 + x1
)
and v(θ) = θα(θ) + x(θ). (29)
Since these arise from a Bayesian game v(θ). This implies that
v′(θ) = α(θ) + α′(θ)θ + x′(θ). (30)
Incentive compatibility implies that α′(θ)θ + x′(θ) = 0. Since α(θ) is a probability, we have
α(θ) = v′(θ) and 1 ≥ v′(θ) ≥ 0 and this ensures that β(θ) ∈ [0, 1].
Next we will see that v′′(θ) = α′(θ) ≥ 0. The first order condition that ensures incentive
compatibility in a Bayesian game is
α′(θ)θ + x′(θ) = 0. (31)
To ensure that θ is a maximum the second order condition
α′′(θ)θ + x′′(θ) ≤ 0, (32)
must hold. Taking the derivative of the first order condition in equation (31) with respect to
θ we have
α′(θ) + α′′(θ)θ + x′′(θ) = 0. (33)
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For equations (32) and (33)to hold α′(θ) ≥ 0 must be true. Hence v′′(θ) ≥ 0.
Finally to see that equation (28) always holds with Bayesian outside options note first
that feasibility implies Eθ
(
1− α(θ)− α1
)
is non negative. Second, the sum of the expected
transfers x1 + Eθ(x(θ)) must be non positive to satisfy the constraint that there must not be
an external subsidy. We can define
ε = Eθ
(
1− α(θ)− α1
)
≥ 0 (34)
and
∆x = −Eθ
(
x1 + x(θ)
)
≥ 0. (35)
From equation (29) we have
v1 = Eθ
(
θ1α1 + x1
)
= θ1 − θ1
∫ θ
θ
α(θ)f(θ)dθ −
∫ θ
θ
x(θ)f(θ)dθ − εθ1 −∆x
(36)
Using equation (16) we know that
x(θ) = v(θ)− θα(θ) +
∫ θ
θ
α(w)dw (37)
Substituting this into equation 2 we have
v1 = θ1 −
∫ θ
θ
(θ1 − θ)α(θ)f(θ)dθ −
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
α(w)dwf(θ)dθ − v(θ)− εθ1 −∆x. (38)
Integrating by parts
v1 = θ1 −
∫ θ
θ
(θ1 − θ)α(θ)f(θ)dθ −
∫ θ
θ
α(θ)(1− F (θ))dθ − v(θ)− εθ1 −∆x. (39)
Substituting v(θ) = v(θ)− ∫ θθ α(θ)dθ and rearranging we arrive at
v1 + v(θ)− θ1 + εθ1 + ∆x =
∫ θ
θ
α(θ)
(
F (θ)− (θ1 − θ)f(θ)
)
dθ. (40)
Since εθ1 and ∆x are both non negative, equation (28) must hold.
Proposition 2 derives the second best allocation in this set up. By construction the
proposition shows how the inefficiency arising from the object being allocated to player 2
cannot be completely avoided. In particular for θ > θˆ we find β(θ) = v′(θ). Note that θˆ that
satisfies equation (17) may not be unique. In such a case we can simple pick the highest θˆ
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since this would lower the inefficiency. If we are prepared further assume that
θ − θ1f(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
> 0, ∀θ (41)
then it is possible to show that there is a unique θˆ that satisfies equation (17). Note that
equation (41) is very similar to the monotone likelihood ratio property seen in the literature.
In fact the monotone likelihood ratio property guarantees equation (41) if 1 > θ1f(θ).
3 Discussion
The inefficiency that arises from games such as contests under complete information disap-
pears as soon as parties are allowed to meet each other costlessly at a stage prior to the
contest as this leads to efficient bargaining that avoids the costs of the contest.6 On the
other hand inefficiencies arising in the problem of allocating an object, when the valuation
of a player is unobservable, disappear when it is clear who values the object most. This
paper attempts to incorporates both these elements. I find that a third form of inefficiency
emerges when players attempt to efficiently allocate an object over which one of them has
private valuation, when their outside options are determined by an inefficient default game.
Since a player’s type enters the payoff of the other player, for instance through the choice of
equilibrium efforts, the outside option of the uninformed player becomes unobservable and
creates an inefficiency. This new inefficiency is neither subsumed by our usual understanding
of the inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetries nor from surplus losses associated
with inefficient games such as contests.
It is possible to contrast this with the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) world, where
the seller’s outside option is his valuation whereas that of the buyer is zero. This is because
property rights are well defined and in the absence of trade the seller walks away with undis-
puted ownership of the object. However this is no longer true when we consider a situation
with fuzzy property rights. Players negotiate over the allocation of an object and both their
outside option are affected by their own valuation and potentially by the valuation of their
adversary. This is particularly true when the outside options arise from some form of contest
such as litigation or war.7 In such a case the payoff from the contest would be determined by
the effort levels of the players, which is turn is determined by their valuations of the object.
Consequently the outside options would depend on the player’s valuation and also the beliefs
about the valuation of her opponent. Since a player does not observe the valuation of her
opponent, her outside option is contaminated by the same informational asymmetry that
affects the bargaining stage.
In this interpretation the inefficiency result presented here indicates that when outside
6If on the other hand negotiation prior to contest involves positive costs it is possible to construct an equilibrium
where players will forgo negotiation even when the contest is costlier. See Anderlini and Felli (2001).
7There is a large literature that uses contests to model conflict. See Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) for a review.
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options represent the equilibrium payoffs from conflict, mechanisms that help players avoid
conflict may not be fully efficient themselves. An example of this is arbitration as a mechanism
to avoid litigation. Although the costs of arbitration are significantly lower than litigation,
parties to arbitration typically higher lawyers to argue their case, and this is costly for both
parties. The results rationalise this phenomenon of dispute resolution mechanisms such as
arbitration involving a smaller but positive degree of inefficiency.
It is interesting to note that in the second best, the participation constraint binds for
the uninformed player. This is unsurprising since this is the only constraint that needs to
be satisfied for player 1. For player 2 the participation constraint binds for higher types
θ > θˆ whereas the lower types receive informational rents since their payoff is constant as
µ(θ) = v(θˆ) for all θ ≤ θˆ. The total inefficiency in the second best is
∫ θ
θˆ
(θ1 − θ)β(θ)f(θ)dθ. (42)
Observation 2. The inefficiency in the second best allocation is decreasing in the inefficiency
in the outside options.
When θˆ = θ, the second best is fully efficient. Assuming that the outside option of
player 2 is non decreasing in his type, which is the case when the outside option arises as
the equilibrium payoff from a Bayesian game, full efficiency is restored when v1 + v(θ) ≤ θ1.
This implies that the efficiency of the second best is inversely related to how efficient conflict
is. We can see this by changing v1 while keeping v(θ) constant. If v1 is low enough such
that v1 + v(θ) < θ1, then it is possible to implement the first best since it is in the interest
of both parties to avoid conflict. However as the payoff from conflict increases, this distorts
the second best allocation away from the first best. Indeed based on equation (17) where θˆ
is defined, we can see that
∂θˆ
∂v1
< 0. (43)
4 Conclusion
This paper introduces a new form of inefficiency that arises with asymmetric information.
Unlike Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and related literature the inefficiency showcased
here does not rely on the uncertainty about which player values the object more. The ineffi-
ciency arises when a player’s outside option depends on the other player’s type. This causes
the informational asymmetry about types to contaminate the uninformed player’s perception
of her outside option. Consequently there are states where the uninformed player overesti-
mates her outside option. I have shown that even when the outside options involve some
inefficiency, if this overestimation is large enough it is impossible to implement the first best.
Furthermore the paper characterises the second best allocation under the assumption that
the outside options arise as the equilibrium payoffs of any unsubsidised Bayesian game.
12
I have argued that this framework where informational asymmetry leads to outside options
being unobservable is natural when considering negotiations between parties when the outside
option is conflict. This paper can be seen as an attempt to characterise a failure of the coase
theorem in the environment where parties attempt to resolve their disputes efficiently when
their outside options are determined by conflict since the best alternatives to conflict may
not deliver the first best.
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